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Risk Management by Farmers, 
Agrlbusinesses, and Lenders 
Ashok K. /lltshra and Sergio H. Lence 
Abstrac t 
Produc:ers ond lenders <e<:k to O\'Oid 
~r1culnoml producllon-rclottd rt•k~ 
through vnr1ous mnnngertaJ ond 
lnslltullonal mr•chnnt.ms. For lndiVIdunl 
fnrm~rb ond nS(rtbnslncs~es. rt•k 
mnnn!!e>ment lnvolves chooslnjlamong 
allrmall•.,.• for rc-ducln8 the effects of rlsk 
on lht• Rm1. thereby ofT~lln~t the Rmfs 
w~lfnre posiUon. Risk management oRen 
r<'<lnlrr• the tvnluoUon of trndcoffs 
bctwt-en clumges In risk. expected retums. 
enlreprc.-ncurinl frt-cdom. and ol hrr 
fuc·tor•. Research on risk monol-(cn1cnt 
l•suc• In Stgt'lrulture hns been ruu onl( the 
moln topics of Interest of the lkijiOnnl 
Rr,;c,art·h CommJttee for Flnuncln,l( 
~rlculturr In 11 Changing Envtronm~nt: 
Mucro. Market. Polley. and Marmgemmt 
l~ur'<, nnd Its predecessors Thill paper 
rC'\1ew~< lind 11umm.~ much of the 
CommlltH'" work and pi'O\'Idt-8 a 
dtsro~slon of related topics of tntere.ot for 
pro8p<'('1h•e futu~ r=n:h. 
Keel UIOI'(/S: fllnn nnanclnl perfonnance. 
ftdcrnl snl>:<ldles. rt.sk·manngem...,l tools 
""'huk K. MIJhrB l\ 110 tconotnl~t In lilt rann and 
Rur .• l l luu~hOifl Wf'll Fk-Lnll Bnuwh ot the Ruourc:c: 
._-.ml «•m•l ~r·m10mloC'a Ot1.rllton. al the [".«n()nUc 
f«'~fln•t• ~~ .... ~. USDA. Scr~le> t1 l.t-nLt '"'" 
wolt'MoCir Ill ltW"" OePQtUnent O(l".cCIU(JnlJC.'l'l. IOWil Stale 
Unt\'('r"ll~y. 'nlt wulhon tlunk two 1.monymou11 
rt'Ykw~n tor htlpful comm·~•n"' nnd IIIIJbOMIIOil'll 
'~be' VIe-w. expno••Md hci'C' on thr nutho,..· and not 
llt"ff'~"ltlty lh&w (}/ IN" £«~non* ~.vtt\ ~ 
or thr U 8 IJrfjt._nrncnt oll\gn(\lltu~ 
In order to discuss rtsk manag.,m.-nt 
Issues In 31(rtculture or any oth.-r lndu•try. 
tt t.s essential to dellne the concopt of rtsk. 
For the purposes of the present study. 
riSk Is dcJlned os the uncertainly factd 
by a tlrm (be It nn lndMdua l. a,l(rlbuslncss. 
or lender) that affects Its welfnre. 
SpectOcally. risk Is often asSOCIItttd with 
adversity ond loss by the Om1. and a l•o 
with Its survival as a business: rt~k Is 
uncertainty thllt affects an tndMc:lunl's 
welfare. and Is often associated with 
adversity and loss: risk is uncertulnty thot 
"matters" and may lnvol•·e the probnblllty 
of lostng money. 
Agrtcultuml production Is risky bt'CRIIISe It 
Is s ubje<:t to unpredictable. random s hocks 
eausro by weather e•;ents. pest dnrnU!(cs. 
diseases. and other natural d!sa.,t.-r. Tht' 
relaU•'C frequency of such C\'Cnts (e.J( •. 
Oood. ftz'C. h."\11, hurt'kanes, and droul.(ht) 
Is bdleved to generate stgnlftcanl ytt'ld 
tostabiUty. F1nns In agrle\lltu~ ~RIM 
exposed to substantial prtce volnUIIIy. 
usually much more so than flnns In other 
sectors or the economy. The slulble 
•"OiaUUly of Qltlicultural pricot stem" In 
large part from 1M signlllcant rundonu1C8s 
In supply coupled wtth the lneiMUc demand 
whJch charnaertzes most agriCUltural 
products 
Gabri~l nnd Baker (1980) ddln<: two IYJI"'' 
of risk In ngncullure. First. buslnes• 
rtsk-r1sk associated Mlh production nnd 
prtce rlsk-g~ncrally Is rcJlected In the 
vartab!Uty or net operntlng Income or net 
cash Oow.' This would also tnclude 
technologlenl risks. lnsUtullonal rl8k . 
• Othrn u&t the ~ ol mums on UM''- u ~" 
allnnalfV'e meM.J'U.r'e olbu..stntu rule. 
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132 Rl.sk Management by Panners, Agrlbuslnesses. and Lenders 
casualty toss risk. legal ris k. and human 
resource risk.' Second , financial risk Is " 
source of rt•k U1al Is very real and hos 
potencJnl effects on the solvency of Onns in 
agriculture. Flnanct:tl risk <llffers from 
)1eld and price risks In U>at tt resull5 from 
the way the firm's capital Is obtained and 
Onanced. A farmer mny be subj~ct to 
fluctuations In Interest mtes on borrowed 
capital. or face cash Oow difficulties If 
Ulere ru·e lnsuffident funds to repay 
creditors. The use of borrowed capital 
means thal a share of the returns from the 
busin ess ruuMt be a llocated to meet debt 
payments. 
In short. risk ts prevnlent In the 
agrJcwtural sector. F\trcJ1er. Ulere Is 
strong evidence sbow1ng farmers are 
typically rlsk· nversc (Just and Pope, 200 I; 
Innes and Ardlla. 1994: 1-lnrdaker. Hulme. 
and Andcr.on. 1997) nnd that they seek 10 
avoid r isks IJ>rough various managerlnl 
and institutional mechanisms {Robison 
aJld Barry. 1987). The InCidence or risk 
~nd rtsk·averse bcha•1or In fam11ng Is 
lrni>OI'Uillt to poUey makers for various 
reasons. For example. nuct uatin!( farm 
lncC>mes. nnd particularly the risk of 
('atastrophlc tosses. may preselll welfare 
problems for farmers and their families. 
Farmers exposed to severe ris k are also 
more lll<ely to default on bank loans. 
which may lead to bod debt and farm 
foreclosures. In the case of systemic 
risks (e.g .. when catasu·opWc losses 
are expericn<:ed by many fnrmers 
simultaneously). farm faUur."S may trigger 
failures of other agrtbustnesses nnd 
lenders. 
For Individ ual farmers •md agnbuslnesscs. 
risk mAnagement Involves ch00$lng among 
alt.cm nuves for reducing the e!Tects of risk 
on the Orm. thereb)' atTecun~ the 01m's 
welfa,·e position. Risk mnnagement often 
requires the evaluation of tradeoiTs 
between changes In rtsk. expected returns. 
entrepreneurial freedom. and other 
1 1-'ur more l nfotm~~~IIOI\ on lt0Un:t6 o( risk ln 
w.grtc:ullure.l!lf'e 1-la.rdaker. Hu1rne. and Andt'r$iOn 
Cl0071: lioeh!Jf' ,,nd ·~ 1197?); Baque,, 1-tambldoo, 
lll.ntl JOI5C C 1097): and flc:iJhcr (19901. 
factors. Some rtsk lllllJla,l(ement strategies 
reduce risk wtlhlo the llnn's operation, 
others trnnsfer risk outside Ule llrm, and 
sUII others buUd the Om1's capacity to bear 
risk {such as maintaining liquid n-ts). 
Just and Pope {200 1) point out that 
runners have dJJfercnt altitudes toward 
ri,k, which Is consistent \\~Ul the findings 
of Cood'lll1.n and Kastens (1993); Innes and 
Ardlla ( 1994): and Barry ond Baker ( t 984). 
Therefore. tile "one-SI?.e·Ot.s-au· 1>amdigm 
does not !ll>ply In the analys ts =d 
lmplernentaUon of risk management 
strategies by fannel'l\. For an tndMduul 
farmer. risk management Involves l\ndtng 
the preferred combination of acU\1tlcs wtU1 
uncertain outcomes =d vuryln!( level• of 
expected retum. SucclnccJy. one might 
s tate Ulal risk management Involves 
choosing among alternatives for reduCing 
the effects of risk on n farm. and In so 
doing. affecting the fatn~'s welfare position. 
In the present study. risk management. 
strategies are clnssl1lcd Into two main 
categories: "w1thln-flnn" strategies nnd 
"risk-sharing" s trat•gtes. With!n ·flrm 
strA tegtes Include. among others. 
(a) on-farm enterprise dlvers tflcaUon: 
(b) collecting more Information "bout 
sc~nartos lnvoMng uncerta.lnty: 
(c) enhanCing product OexibiUty and/or 
n55ct flCXJbillly:• (d) avoiding risky 
techuolol(les: (e) reducing leverage: and 
(f) Increasing liquidity (I.e .. the finn's 
nbillty c.o generate cush quickly and 
effiCiently In order to meet Onanclnl 
obligations) and matntaln!ng llnanclal 
reserves. 
Among r1sk~sharlrlg sl,roteg1~5. U\c 
follow1J1g are of special note: (a) buytng 
Insurance {e.g .. crop Insurance. revenue 
Insurance. lnSurllllce on buildings and/or 
machinery. etc.): (b) hedgiJJ8 using 
contmcts lmded In dertmtlves markets 
(e.g .. futures and opUons contract.s): 
, Product fkxlbllny rxi~l8 when R.f• em~ 
pmdUtt$ atl output t.hot hR~ more t.hon OCloC' eod Uk'. 
A$.5'1 Rt=ldblllty means ln\o-e!illng ln as.:M:t& Which C3Jl bt-
Uic:d hl more u~rm Ofl(" produc."lion procc"$.. 
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A!Jrlculwral F!nclflre Review, Fall 2005 
(c) producing und~r prnducuon and 
markellng contro<'t,: (dj leasing Inputs 
and htrtng nr~tom work: and (el obtalnlng 
ofT· fann 90ln'CM or tnrom<! (~.g .. off-fann 
tmploymt'nt by thf' ~tor. the spouse, 
orbo<h) 
To C!Valuate whether var1ous rtsk-
rnru>agtmcnt tools and stmtegles are 
efTccllve In achl~nf! manajlcrtal goals 
r~lnl! rtsk, ll Is csscnUal to expres" 
rtsks ln quanUtaUve terms. SubstanUal 
rc.,..arch has bten conducttd esumaung 
the price and ylt>ld rt.'k f.~ced by fanners 
(Goodwin and Kff. 1998, 2001: Goodwin. 
1994: Ker and Col*. 20031. The exacc 
dl•trtbutlon or~ risks has been a topic 
or much di"CCJ~•ton for many years. 
Economists have ul>C(I various altemaUve 
approaches to model decision maldng In 
•ltuattono tnvolv1nA rtsk.,.' These 
approaches llr<' bMcd on the noUon th:ll 
coch risk s tmlrl()l r1ffrrs producers a 
dlffcr•ent probability dlst.ribullon of Income, 
and rhal d<'lrm•lnlnglhe besr strategy 
Involves dl'S<'Iiblnf!lhe different 
dlstrtbuuons and developing rules to 
choose :tmnng rh~m 
Research on risk mnnogement Issues In 
ll!(rtculture hM been tunong the main 
t.oplcs of In I crest of tho Rel(tonal Research 
Cornmlll~'C for l•'lnourh111il~cullure ln a 
Chnnl(lng J;nvtr·onmcnt: Macro, Market. 
I·'Oilcy. And Mnnngtmcnr !&sues. and tts 
predecessor!. Clven 01e wealth or 
research performed by U1e Commlllee over 
the years, lh~ purpo.y of the present study 
Is to ~cw and •umma~ such wodk. 
nnd to dl.scuss relnttd toprcs ofimerest for 
future re...-:trch. 
'rhc fiN I IWO •~lion• of I he Sludy focus on 
the research lnsll(ill>~l(leaned from the 
l>''l><'f'8 P~•~nrNI owr the p.'>&t 20 y.-ars nt 
U1c annual nwt'rln"" of U1c CommJuee 
which dealt with rtsk mllJ'UII!efflentlssues 
In :lgi1Cultul'f' F...- I his purpose. studi~ 
•llll'" ~ popu\M' • ppr'CIIIIdllt'lf Aft Ia) the ~tel 
ullloly ......,. tbllhr •t• V" and ,.-... 
mo<l.l.,..,..... • • ..,......"""" ol t><pO<t<d uUiityl, 
td thr MO(t\.»1!. dunlolfliUlC'f' ••J>t)tOa(:b. and tdl W 
llol.~ty ftN Appn~4·h 
ML!I!ro nrrd Lentt 133 
are grouptd accordln,l( to U·te main type of 
rfsk·managemmtslr.U<"gy oddre&Std. by 
foUowlng the pre-1ously ldenllfled strarcgy 
classlftcaUons-1..-.. wlthln·llnn strategies 
and rtsk·sbartng str:tl~. The final 
section Is devoted to a dlscuMIOil or 
research topicS of potenUallnten.-.st which 
agrtcultural economl515 could undcrtal<e 
over the next few yea.,., 
Within-Firm Risk-
Management Strategies 
Dfverai.ftcation 
The Farm Credit S}'>'tem c.11panded Ill> 
agricultural dcbtln the 1970s comp:u'ed 
to other lenders. Farm flnandnl strc,.,; 
during the early 19808 placed agrtcultul"dl 
finandal intennedturtcs In o prt-cnrtous 
sttuatJon . Since the l'onn Credit Sy91em 
was the largest farm re11l e~~tnte lender, 11, 
was the most severely affected Onan~lal 
intermediary durtng periods or farm SIJ'e<.S. 
Moss and Fcatherslonr ( 1988) <'JC3mlntd 
the posslbU!Ues of dlverslflcatlon 
opportunities within the ~·ann Credit 
S}'>'tem. Using the Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory to test whether risk· free profll5 
cou ld be obtalncd by lntdlniJ lo!ut>l 
between the dlslr1ets of tire Fnrm Cr(.'dtt 
System, they concluded thol addition:>! 
dlverslllcaUon wllhln the F'n.nll Credll 
System was not likely, nnd U1us lnldlng 
loans between dtstrtcl.& would not resultln 
risk-free proDrs. 
More recently. Katchovn 12002) cor>ducttd 
an emplrlcal examlnallon or the effect or 
diversification across ajl)1rultuml acUviUr:, 
on protltablllty. Sh~ round that n 
crop/lh"eStock diversified fann had lower 
average value and lower n>'t'rnj(e r~tum on 
~'<tully than a comblnoUon or 0 Spe<'~IIIZed 
crop farm and a spednllttd livestock fam• 
with similar overall our put. Kalehova's 
results imply dh..,.,I.Ocallon In agriculture 
does not make Sft'SC as o stral~ to 
enhance ,oaJue. but lllC results do not rule 
out dlverslllcatloo as an efTecU>'t' strat~ 
to reduce risks. H~. because of the 
data used 1n her IUlnlysls, Katebova's 
findings should be lnlerprer<Od with 
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13-4 Risk Management by Farmers. Agrlbuslnesses. and Lenders 
cauUon. The author u~ farm-le--e! data 
l'rom Illinois. where most fanns tend to he 
large nnd sJ>"daliT.cd tn cash grams. 
Therd'ore. benefits of specialization could 
he more pronounced. but elsewhere 
(under dliTerent agronomic condiUons) 
enterprise diverstncaUon could he more 
hen~flclal . 
ln another study. Mlshrn. El-Osta. and 
Sandretto (2004)lnvesUgated enterprise 
cU,-erslllcnUon by U.S. farmers as a self-
tnsurtng stratell.)'. In particular. the 
authors examined various farm. operator. 
and household characteristics on the level 
of on-fann enterprise dtverslficatlon. The 
study found that large farms were more 
SJ)C:<'Iallzed. and that farms located near 
urban areas. fanners who participated ln 
off-farm work. and lilrms with higher debt-
to-lll;set ratios were less Ukcly to diversify. 
FurU1cr. the findings suggest a posltlve 
relaUonshlJ) between diversiJlcatlon and 
parUtlpallon In crop Insurance and direct 
government puym(!llt:;. 
Information 
Jn n Purdue Unlverstly SUI~lcy study of 
large-scale fanners. agrtcu ltural lenders. 
01J1d professional farm managers. 
UUcrtch and Patrick (1995) summartzed 
sources of Information. sources of and 
responses to rlsk. and the wllllngness of 
farmers. lenders. and fann managers to 
t>ay for risks. The autl1()rs reponed that 
aU Llu-ec groups rated Information sources 
ns Important In making production 
decisions. Fewer sources of Information 
were rated Important in malting marketing 
and ll.nanclal deciSions. These Included 
InformAtiOn on employees and reoords. 
tenants. or borrowers. UUerlch and 
Pntrlck r~ported slgntOcant dtiTerences 
among the three groups In the individual's 
self-assessed wUUngness to take rtsk. 
Results of the survey also Indicated no 
stgnlflcant diiTerences ln risk aversion 
between farm mum>gen; and agricultural 
bnnkers. 
The use of business Information by 
farmers was examined by Cloy and LaDue 
12002). who looked at the bustnes.• 
analysis techniques u~ by a group of 
New York dairy fanns and their respcet!Ve 
finandal performance. The most 
commonly u~ business analysts 
method employed by these farms was 
trend analysiS. F1ndln~s also revealed 
that almost 75% of farms prepared 
6nandal budgets either on an annual 
basis or when they were plannlnl( to make 
major changes tn operations. Importantly. 
Cloy and LaDue uncovered a strong 
positive relationship between a fann·s 
usage of Investment analysts and Its 
profitability. 
The vast majority of the t>Xlsllnl( crop 
Insurance and risk management llteratur~ 
Is underpinned by the assumption that 
producers accurately understand and 
rationally respond to the riSk.$ they fnce. 
Sherrtck (200 1) asserts that. su bjccllvc 
probablUty belief.~ about ImportAnt 
wea ther variables are systemoucally 
miscallbraled to the true distributions. 
In his s tudy. Sherrick examines the 
assu mption that producers possess 
accurate probability beliefs when 
evaluating rtsk vartables which all'ccl 
their financial well-being. He concludes 
that signillcant errors In producer•' 
risk assessment• and lnsurnnce 
valuaHons artse simply because prodnccrs 
possess systematically Inaccura te 
probablllty beliefs. especially about the 
weather. 
Differences In yield-model spec!!lcauons 
can significantly Impact quanlltntlve 
assessments of revenue rtsk. Insurance 
values. and other comr>one.lts of fam1ers' 
risk-management decision.~. In a related 
study. Zantnl el al. (2000) evaluate 
parametric yield spceiOcallons and asse;s 
thetr Implications for mluallon of average 
production history and crop revenue 
Insurance products. TI1e authors conclude 
that having yield spceiOcaUons as an 
unexamined premise may lead to Incorrect 
conclusions tn other Important nreas of 
insurance research. such as policy rating 
and quantltaUve assessment of expec~ed 
losses from different types of policies. 
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Leverage 
Cloy and Baker (2001) argue Ulal r1sk 
aversion and flnanclalleverage ore 
Important when making rt5k-management 
Strate!()' sel~tions. 111c authors also 
show that the stochastic dominance 
appt·oach With risk-free asset cr1t.er1a 
reduces the number of risk-management 
strategies a rnnnager must consider 
without makln,l( slrong assumptions 
about rt5k preferences. 1\ddtng leverage 
wM found to be a more effident way to 
lncJ·cnse retuntS thar1 reverting to a 
strategy with a !(l"catcr mean and 
business risk. 
Using dntn from U.S.·bosed food 
processors. Spol'leder and Moss (200 I) 
found leverage was negaU\~Iy related to 
UlC amount of Intangible assets. 
prolltabilily. nnd lnveslrllent autonomy. 
Their rcsulls sugg<!St food pro~&SOrs \'lew 
equity and debt not so much ns allernattve 
flnanctng Instruments and/or strategies. 
but a• alternal.!ve governance slructut"e3. 
with equity prov1dtng greater decision· 
malting discrellon than debt. Sporleder 
and Moss report that managers prefer 
equity capital financing over debL 
Decisions nboul Unaoclnl leverage can 
have major lmpnc" on the long-run 
stm'ival of agl'lcu llural firms. Gtven the 
level of business risk. the owner v.111 
choose a capital Structure or 8 level of 
Unancta I leverage whlch will maxlmlze 
expected uullty of returns to equity. 
subject to personal risk preferences. 
Risk-balancing Issues as Influenced by 
leverage art' well documented In c he 
literature (Gabriel And Baker. 1980: 
Barry and B.~ker. 1984: Collins. 1985). 
Using panel data from Kanoas over the 
period 1973-1988. a nd nssuoung 
maximization or the expected utlllty or 
returns to cqutty. Jen.osen and Langemeler 
(1996) lnvt'SU,I(utc opUmal leverage and the 
factors aiTcctlnl( leverage. Based on Ulelr 
findinl(s. lev~e ts a.!Tcctrd theoretically 
and empirically by tax I>OIIcy, risk. fnrm 
profl toblllty. and growti' rate In the ''alue 
or assets. 
Mishra and Umce 135 
The relnllonships among business risk 
(Gabriel and Baker. 19801. profitability 
(Collins. 1985), price supports 
(Featherstone et al .. 1988). taxes !Moss. 
Forcl. and Boggess. t989), and financial 
risk consHtute risk-balancing dlmt'.nslons 
or agricultural policy. Risk balancing 
refers t.o the adjustments In the 
components oflolal risk (I.e .. business riSk 
nnd financial risk) rcsult.!ng from an 
exogenous shock to the existing ba lance: 
(Gabrtel and Dal<er. 1 980). 
1\brcndsen. Callender. and Dixon (1994) 
extended the baste model of Oolllns and 
Barry ( 1986) and nddc:d to the dimensions 
Of riSk balan cing through relallonshlps 
among depreclnllon. Investment tox 
credits. and financial risk. The a uU1ors 
concluded that poUcles (such as 
depreciation and Investment tax credit 
deductions) '"'hlch Increase fanners profi ts 
or decrease fanners' business risk may. tn 
fact. Induce fanners without constmlned 
credit to Increase flnanctal risk 1 hrough 
capital structure ad.fusuncnts. However, 
as the authors potnt out. the adjustment 
process Is Ukely to be ~low. 
The tax lrealrllml of capital gains Is n 
potentially Important factor afTecung 
Investment In agriculture. M<>SS, ford. 
and Boggess ( 1989) cooslruct a theoretical 
model explaining the effect of the 
elimination of capital gains deduction on 
tnveslrllent decisions In U.S. agncullurc. 
Using aggregate U.S. dala . their analysts 
shows that elimination of u,e capital gains 
exclusion r:~lses optlmal leverage levels 
and I he probabutty of a negative rate of 
return to equity for nil levels ofnsk 
nvcrs1on. 
Equilibrium 3nalysls under r1sk evaluates 
a firm's I)()SSible responses to r.hanges In 
the r1sk characteristics of Its envlronmenl. 
Barry and Robtson ( 1987) employ 
t'(Jullfbrlum analysts under risk l<J analyze 
flnanclal structure at the llnn level. In 
parllcular. ustng the ponfoUo theory 
framework. eoncepiS of business risk. 
llnanclalt1sk. and r1sk balanCing. they 
assess the possible responses In flnanclt•l 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 Io
w
a 
St
at
e 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 1
1:
07
 0
7 
M
ar
ch
 2
01
6 
(P
T)
136 Risk Management by Fc:mners. Agrtbus!nesses. and Lenders 
s tructure to changes In a finn's operating 
en,1ronment and In the Investor's risk 
nttfrudes. 'rhetr results show lmport.'lnt 
lirlk.~ges between theory arrd practice in 
nnanctal ··espouses to risk and pro\1de 
,l(eneral guidelines for Implementing 
portfolio ndjustments. 
LlquJdlty and Financial Reserves 
A .rudy by Burghardt and Robison (1 984) 
explains the application of a computer 
slnnolauon noodcl built to facilitate the 
cx:aminntion of a ltemallve rtsk-
manngement strategi<'S on agricultural 
firms' liquidity. llnancla l stress. and 
Investment management under 
uncertainty. Their model was designed 
to Integrate financial strategies wtth 
production. murkeling, and risk-
management strategies of typical Midwest 
cash grain farms. 
Chhikara (1986) developed a model based 
on the expected ·utlllty paradigm to explain 
an agricultural firm's demand for cash and 
credit reserves (I.e .. unused credit or 
borrowing powt:r) as a response to risk. 
In general. he conflm1ed empirical 
support for the model when he tested It 
using data from Illinois farms. Chhikara 
found that Uquldit:y valu e curves declined 
monotonically With debt levels. lmplylng 
credit reserves quickly lost their liquidity 
value for !lnanctally stressed farms. Based 
on this result. credit reserves were of Uttle 
uS<' to distressed farms as a rlsk-
nl:lnal(emenr tool. 
Finance theory suAAests that Increases In 
1\nanctal leveraj!e ratse the e.'<J)«tcd level 
nnd varlnblllty of returns on a farm's 
equity capital. prm1ded the returns on 
""""ts aceed the cost of borroWing. 
Because risk attitudes (and expectations) 
may differ among farmers. lt is plausible to 
expect a wtde ranl(e of optimal !lnanclal 
structures. Cwtnn. Barry. and E:Utnger 
(1992) derive risk-efficient growth plans 
and !lnanclal structure:. for representative 
cash groin fanns under a broad set of 
«mrce• of risk and various levels of risk 
aversion. Farm s11..e. a sset structure, and 
debt level are shown to change 
signUlcanUy with risk-aversion levels and 
are consistent '~th empirical observations. 
Farmers '~th low levels of risk aversion. 
or even risk neutrality. v.111 prefer higher 
debt-to-asset ratios and achJetce larger 
operations. faster financial growth. and 
larger expected Incomes. 
Other "Within-Firm" Rlsk· 
Management Strategies 
Stnger (1998) discusses reasons why 
managers may "smooth'" income. I.e .. 
engage In activities to reduce the 
fluctuation or their llrms· reported net 
income. An lmporlanl potenUaJ reason Is 
that tncome-smoolhlng may Improve the 
percepllon of the firm's risk by providers 
of e><temal capital (e.g., equity Investors 
and lenders). Singer analytes a special 
mocbanism for smoothing Income available 
to commercial banks-namely. the 
pro,1slon for loarr losses. The pro,1sion for 
loan losses Is the amount banks charge 
against current earnings to bulld reserves 
aimed at absorbing future loan losses. He 
found slgnlllcarrt evidence that rural as 
well as urban banks used lhe provision for 
loan losses to smooth Income. Thls finding 
Is lmportant from a regulatory standpoint 
because using the pro~sloo to smooth 
Income Is at odds "1th the regulatory 
guJdeUnes for commercial banks. 
Risk-Sharing Management 
Strategies 
Insurance 
The Federal insurance Act of 1980 
authorized an ex-pansion of lhe Insurance 
program to become lhe prtmary foml of 
disaster protection for fanners. Insurance 
may protect farmers from yield s h ortfall 
and thereby stabJilz.c Income and provide 
liquidity when crop losses occur. 
Leatham. Richardson. and McCarl (19851 
evaluated a producer's choice of CTOJ> 
Insurance and Investigated the Implications 
of thts choice on lhe lender's performance. 
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Agril'ullural Flnnnre Reutew. Pall2005 
Tile authors found c:rop lnsuronce favors 
producers with hlflh~r !~Is of y1eld 
>'artablllty. Thr <hotce of crop Insurance 
by producers dej>ffids principally on thdr 
expected tn,urnnce loss mUo and risk 
aversion. 
Federal sub.~lclles to crop ln~urnnce 
produets have lnr...,ased, !hereby lowering 
premium• p;lld by fanners for Insurance 
products. 1'hcse changes were made 1111lh 
!he goal of Improving the attractiveness of 
crop IMurance to fanners. Ullle dl~t 
C\1d<nce exists concerning the effe<ts of 
crop lnsumnce u~ on crop revenue rtsk, 
and sun Irs~ work examines the relative 
performnnce across nlternaUve Insurance 
productS (e.g .. types and coveroge levcls) 
and across dlflerem y1cld risk condJUons. 
Schnttkey. Sltt'rrtck. and IN.1n (2002) 
im-csugate t hr rt•k lmplleauons of n wide 
range of crop Insurance produets In actunl 
farm cont<·xts. Risk Implications are 
nnaly..ed by compnring gross revenue 
dlstrtbutlons without crop Insurance to 
gros.~ re>"Cnue dl~lrtbutlons resu!Ung from 
the Inclusion of diiTerc:nt crop Insurance 
products. Findinl(s Indicate the group 
pollctes oftm re1ulttn 3\'C:r3ge payments 
exceeding their premium c:osts. lndMdu nl 
revenue products reduce rtsk In the taUs 
more thnn ~troup policies. but result In 
greater rt"dU('IIon~ 1n mean revenues. 
Ranklnl(s bMt'<l on ccrtn.lnty equlvnJent 
returns and low frequency VaRs (V31ue-at· 
risk) genemlly favor m·enue products. 
As expected. crop lnsuranee Is IIS90Ciated 
with greater rc:IAU~ risk reduction In 
IO<'allons with ~ler underl)1ng y1dd 
vartablllty. 
The co•~>• 11 11<1 benefits from using crop 
Insurance 111l\Y differ based on the deMI!,'l'l 
of the lnSir<ll1H'nt l'ho~cn by the producer. 
Wan!( el nJ . ( 1997) study the relative 
perfonnanC'<" of lndMdual·.)'l~ld and area-
yield crop lt"urnnce progmms. 
Perform:mN" L~ measured by fanners· 
parUdpaUon rates nnd farmer "-el!are In 
an e;cpected utUity Crnm..,.'Ork. Ustng a 
ponlfollo :~etUng (producers ha~ a vnt1cty 
of risk-man~cment lnstnaments Including 
option•. futures, government payments . 
Mtsltra and l.eru:e 137 
nnd crop Insurance). Wong et aJ. found 
that an lnsumnce contrnct based on an 
area y1eld Index Is less exp<"nSI~ to 
lmplonent nnd may h:we more: aurncu,-e 
premiums than a contract ~ on an 
tndMdual farm y1eld Index. 
1\n Important aspect of ln8urance (and of 
other risk·managc:rnem s trnte,l(les as well) 
Is that liS use by a finn makes the firm 
more attrnctlve to potential external 
providers of capllal (e.g .. lenders and 
external Investors). In thlo rej[tlrd. 
llnanCialadversiUes experienced by the 
farm sector In the 1980>1 hlg)tlllo(hted the 
close relauonshll> between fann boiTOwers 
and lenders. It became very clear that 
both parties bad a slgnllk:ant •take In 
actions which Influenced !he profil3bWty. 
liquidity. Md rtsk posiUon off= 
buslne68e8. l'flueger and Onny ( 19851 
annlyzc:d the relauonshlp between fnnners' 
use of crop Insurance and the cost and 
avallabiiJty of credlt from their major 
non-rent estate lenders. Ba8Cd on survey 
dal3 and on the result~ from a simula tion 
model. the authors found Utat. at least 
from the lenders' \1ewpolnt. the use or crop 
ln.surnnce by a fann could reduce Its 
business risk enough to allow higher 
flnanclnl rtsJc nrislng from the greater 
amount of credit made available to 
borrowers . POueger and Burry concluded 
crop Insurance mny havt <'<msldernble 
m~rit when combined with otlwr 
management or poUcy oclloa\8 lltat reduce 
Indebtedness or Increase rc:v<'nua~ for 
bJghly le--ernged. low-«}ulty crop f3rmS. 
M~ ~tly. Seo. Leatham. and MalcbelJ 
(2003) used a prtndpal·ogent model 10 
determine on ext~malln~lor's prel'erence 
for rrop Insurance and the fanner's 
production decision~. 1'he nnthorg further 
determined the optlmol risk sharing 
between tbe Investor nnd form~rs wltll 
crop Insurance and ex1Crnol Ononctng. 
Red~ w1th Contract• Traded 
lD Derl....Uvet~ Marll:eta 
Because or the farm crut• lh.~t look place 
In lhr United States In the cnrly to 
rnld- 1980s. much or the llllenllon at the 
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138 Rtsk Management by Farmers. Agrlbusincsses. and Lenders 
Urn~ focused on the financial s ituation 
of fnrms and the lending sector. 
Government. researcher.;, and policy 
makers were Interested tn finding ways to 
reduce the buJ'Cicn of debt owed by fanners 
and bonkers. Flnanclnl management 
became a very inlportant Issue, and a long 
with It the tools I() manage financial risk. 
The September 1984 mecllng of Committee 
N· l6 1 was dedicated to lluanclal futures 
and options and lhetr potentia l use In 
agrtcullure. Uns ( 1984) reported a rise In 
financia l risk . through more borrowed 
funds and nutcroeconomic factors. during 
the c·arly to mld- 1980s. The author 
outlined vnrlous policy tns lnm>ents 
affecting Interest rate variability and 
parties who were affected by Increased 
Interest rat.e variability. L.lns proposed 
lntere~t rate futures and opUons as an 
elfectlve mechanism for lenders and 
borrowers to o.f!Set thetr Interest rate r1Sk. 
So Iverson and Herr ( 19841 presented a 
development of futures markets and 
expln!ned the basic temllnology used by 
trad~pectally by those trading 
llnanclal futures. Heffernan and L-ee 
(19841 outlined hedging strategies for Farm 
Credit System lenders. The authors 
described and analyted the debt 
management program and then compared 
two hrdglng st ratcgies. Solverson and 
Herr found Interest rate hedging would 
allow the Form Credit System banks and 
a sRoctattons to b•·oadcn their ran!(e of 
services beyond the dominant vartable rnte 
loan. By hedging a portion oft he debt 
portfolio. the Farrn Credit System cou ld 
offer toorrowers llxed ra1es for at least some 
spectOed t1mc period. 
Ombens101.1 and McDonlcy (1 9841 
discussed the ls~ues surrounding the use 
offinanetal futures by ngncultural banks 
In the early 1980s. They a lso reported 
data on the use or nnanctru full! res by 
agricultural banks oblalned from a survey. 
The authors point~l outll>a t agrlc\llturul 
banks wt-rc slower lo lncorporol e fulures 
Into their riSk-management strategies 
than urban lenders. Financial futures 
were found to be most effective when 
Incorporated Into a well-planned 
asset/liability management strategy. 
Based on thcJr survey results. not many 
agncultural banks were using financial 
futures. bu t financial futures were effecUvt 
tools to deal Mlh interes t rate r1sk. The 
survey also revealed that large banks were 
more likely to usc flnandal futures. and 
small banks lacked expertise to become 
involved In llnnncial futures. 
Commercial banks have a lways 
encountered nsks in their normal course 
of business. However. when Interest roles 
ore volaUie (a s they were In the early 
1980s). U1ere Is an increased r1sk of 
mismatching lnteres t-sensiUve assets and 
lktbtUtles. Oraben:stott and McOonley 
(19841 employed an economic model of a 
ru raJ bank to demonstrate the lmponane<! 
of hed1,~ng on bank performance. Findings 
showed U1at hedging the cost of borrowing 
when rates arc rising enables banks to 
Increase O\'erali port folio size and 
stgnlllcantly raise earning~. 
The usc of derlvatJves by lending 
tnstJtuUons was the focus of a study by 
Yang and L-eatham ( 1996). They reviewed 
the u•e of interest ra te der1vntlve$ by 
major lenders to agr1culture. more 
specifically commercial banks. thrill 
Ins titutions. and life Insurance companies. 
They also discussed the beneOt.s and r1sks 
of using tl.nanclal der1v:tttves by s uch 
insllluttons. 
liedglng In flnanclnl futures markets can 
offset the doUar loss on the loan 
(addiUonallntercst cost due to rising rates) 
with a I(IUn in the futures market. I-euck 
and l,.euthold (19841 examined the usc~ of 
hedging by grn!n elevators on variable rate 
debt and cortcluded grain elevator 
managers could reduce Interest nt te risk 
nnd the cost of debt by hedging borrowed 
debt In the llna nclal rutures market. 
Further. the au thors tound lhot hedl(tng 
costs were usually greater for private grain 
elevators thun for cooperaUvc ele-•ators 
because the cost of debt for the fom>er was 
rellected by the prime rate~ and """~ more 
volaUie than for coopernUves. 
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Agricultural Finance Review, F'aU 2005 
Financial futures are useful lor hedging 
positions In situations In which there is 
symmetry of !(Sins and losses. In the cn.sc 
or asymmetrical gains a nd losses. a 
convenuonn l futures market hedge rnay 
only re\•erse the .symmetry. Thus. risk 
would not be reduced ctllclcnUy. If at all. 
A potentially u..cful risk-management tool 
applicable to these cases Is an OJ)IIon. 
Leatham and Baker ( 1984) discussed 
mcU1ods of using financial OI>Uons by 
providing background Infonnntton about 
options on financial futures and then 
lllustroUn!1 a hypothetical hedgtng 
situation. Tiw authors suggested that call 
options would serve banks and lenders 
bell cr for llxrd-rate loans. 
Fnnners· use of fu tures and optlotl.S to 
hedge grOWing and s tored crops can 
reduce p1iee risk and d<'CI'ease the 
vana11ee on the returns to equity. Turvey 
and Baker ( 1988) argued that data from 
Ontruio f.·-.nns do not support the expected 
behavior or rlsk-averu farmers. as only 
I I % of farms us~"<l hedgtng. Tite authors 
e.xamtned alternative motiva tions. 
especially the liquidity motive. lo r.~nners' 
u se of hedging strategies. They found a 
dlre<'t correlation between relative rtsk 
aversion nnd hedging. and a n Inverse 
rclaUonshlp between credit reserves and 
hedging. Results of thetr study s11pported 
their lly]>Othcsl• that Uquldtly may be a 
motivuUon for farmers' use of futures and 
hedging. 
Tt•rvey and Nayak (1997) explored the 
relaUon~hlp between hedging with futures 
and fann capital s tructu re. They 
esunml ed a simultaneous hed!,'lng model 
or prtce. yield. and foreign exchange. In 
po.rtlcular. they investigated the Impact of 
the hedging dectstons of a Canadian Orm 
using U.S.-based prtce a11d yield futures 
on farm business. financial, and total 
risks. The authors developed a risk-
minimizing hedj~e ratio for the joint 
hcd,I!Jng decis ions. and concluded that 
jointly hedl(lng price and yield can reduce 
r<:vcnue ri8k more tho.n hedgtng only v.1th 
price futures. Turvey and Nayak 
envisioned the p()sSibtllly that revenue 
Mtshm and Lence 139 
lnsurance/assumnce programs provided 
by the gavenunent. or crop Insurance 
provid~'<l publicly or privately. could be 
re!113ured through effe()tive hedging In 
Canada and the United States. 
Yields and revenues obtained by crop 
producers have both systemic (drought 
and priee drops) and pooloble [localized 
yteld s hortfall) risks. Farmers cannot 
hedge the poolable or localized sources of 
revenue riSk on sp<~ulaUve markets. and 
Insurance companies will not accept ris k 
which has a systemic component. A.• a 
result, a hybrid mechaniSm has c:-volved In 
U.S. crop lnsurnnee markets wherein the 
federal government agrees to accept the 
systemic risk so that private insuranc~ 
companies will sell crop and revenue 
Insurance co producers. 
Mason. Hayes. nod Lence (2001) c~tlmated 
the total risk absorbed by the u.s. crop 
Insurance industry and separated It Into 
poolable and systemic compon~nts. They 
t.hcn used opUon pricing theory to value 
the reinsurance provided by the federal 
government when It absorbs this systemic 
rtsk. The a uthors also examined U1e 
possibility of ustng speculative m.1rkets In 
prices and yields to hedge U1e systemic 
risk accepted by the government. They 
concluded that rtsk reduction achlevnble 
by hedging Is appreciable. but use of 
dert,·auve contracts alone Is clearly no 
panacea. 
Production and Marketing 
Contracts 
A study by Dodson (1996) focused on the 
potential lmplicotlons of production 
contracts for rtsk mana~ement. f-Ie 
concluded the risk-return tradeoff for the 
contracted commodity Is likely to be o 
major determinant of the use of controcts 
by farmers. For commodities like 
processed fruits. vegetables, and some 
specialty crops. Dodson argued that 
farmers enl(a!lcd in contract output may 
not only be able to reduce their risks bul 
also lncrem;e their profit marglns. In 
contrast. for other fnmtS such ;>s those 
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140 Risk Mcmooe,.,nr by f"OITl1er'S, Agrtbuslncssl!s. <Uld U:ttders 
engaged In hog production. contracts may 
only pt'Ov1de a mt'aOS lo reduce risk. 
OodJion's conclusions were based oo his 
finding that crop fanns With contraciS 
were larger. luld more <'<JUIIy. and CJ1JOYed 
hlgher return< than crop farms Without 
contract:.. whereas poultry and hog 6l.rnt$ 
11.1th contracts had I~ <'<Julty. higher ddlt 
levels. and exhlbltNI more llnnnctal stress 
than poultry and l•og farms Without 
contrRcls. 
Leasing Inputs 
Th~ elfec:ts of lnl<'rest rate volaUiity and 
tax rq!ttlallons on the d10lcc between 
lease and own~,.,.hlp of Cann machln~ 
was lnvesllg:oted by P\.'dct80n (1984) by 
means of a slmulllUo•• model. Purehasing 
w;:~s found 1 o v.·eakly domlnule leastng for 
rlsk~avcrse farm{·n. In many scenarios. 
ar>d it'Ming was lh1· most rlsk-cfllden l 
choloe for risk prrferrlng fanners. 
H010.evcr. Peden.on caul lOlled that results 
were quJte l<<'n51Uie to the futUJ'\' dynamics 
of totcrest "'"'"· 
to Umes of financial Crisis In ngrtculture. 
greater emplulsls has been placed on 
mea..<urtng farm Rnanctal performance. In 
much oftht' lltcruture. the debt-to-a.sset 
rntlo Is used"" an lndtcutor ofRnancta l 
stress. Ellinger a11d llnrry (1987) point ou l 
that tenure has slgniRcantlmpllcations for 
performance. T<·nurc Is lmportn.nl because 
11 conslderatm Mlounl of land Is opernled 
by fanus under '-ru1o<t• types o( leasing 
1\J'n\Jlgemenc.,. The nuthots evaluated the 
~nects of fanners· t~nur~ position on t..-o 
key perfonna~ rncosures profltablllly 
and solvency. Thtlr Rndln!,'S reveal that 
htgh~r land OWO<',..,hlp ts """tlCIIlted With 
lower accounllng rat~ of return and lower 
h:wernge JX>"Itlons. " " •~nnncy Increases. 
rates of return on aRst·ts and l~rnge 
positions ""' oon5lstently higher. f'unher, 
as tenancy tncrea,...,., fam1 sue as 
Oleit!'Jured by acres nl.ttO lnC'rf'ases. 
L.rnslng land for ~~gr~cultnml produouon 
lli IU\Other wny to reduce risk (Barry. 
Escalante. ~nd Moss. 2002). The long~ 
s"mdlng prncllcr of ~hare leasing farmland 
Is Increasingly gtv1ng way to cash lcll!llng 
and to combinations of cash and share 
leastog (Reiss. I 984). The drlv~rs of 
change prtmar1Jy lnvoh'e risk. Income. 
man..-.gertal control. and l:md vulues 
lssuca faetng formers. landowners. and 
prolesstonal fann matllij(ers who rcp~t 
landowners (Sotomayor. Ellinger. and 
Darry. 2000). 
Darry. ~:sralante. and MosA (2002) 
co~ptuallzcd th~ risk -adjusted valuation 
of <'ash \'ersus share I~ for fanners 
and l:mdowners. and tested their model 
using Cann-le--cl data from Illinois. In 
parUculllr. the authors empirically 
detcnnlned how rental spreads b<>tween 
cash and sbate leases are related to rtsu 
and other farm charactt•rlsllca They 
concluded that non· rl.sk factors al'e Ukely 
to be the prtmnry dctennlnants of I he 
mngrutudc and sii!Jl of the renwl Aprcad. 
nnd point out that hlr;:h cash rents may be 
a bidding strategy to control odd!Uonal 
leased a.-reage Md thus expand fann size. 
External Equity 
Advantages and disadvnntagr" of resorting 
to ext<:mal eqUity ns a means co reduce 
risks und/or tocl't'Ming caplll\1 were 
addt·essed by Lowenberg·D•I'loer et al. 
(19871. Overall. they argu(·{( that exlemal 
equity was not likely to be an economically 
vloble strategy. becnu~~e of lt.w rclnllvely 
Wgh trnnsaetiOn cosl.s and the potential 
dlstoruon of management lncenu,..,. 
HOYo'<'\~r. they stl'eSsec:l that their 
conclu~IOns were limited by the: small 
amount o( research avallllble regarding 
u~e of external equity by farms. and by 
proprietary ftrms In general. '11'•<1r study 
concluded with a long ll•t of topics of 
rctcvnnce for futuJ'c 1-esearch In lhc are-a . 
Off·Fann Income ancl lnve• tments 
Oe<'egulauon of llnanctnl markets In the 
late 1980& P""ided frumers wtth new 
opportuniUes to dJ\'ei"Slfy U1dr ln~nts 
Into ofT-farm ftnanctal MselS. Howe-·er. 
sun--ey data on South Dakota farmers. 
collected and annlyzed by Gustafson and 
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Chnma ( 1992) In th<' (rtrly 1990s. revealed 
...,..pondents had noc taken advantage of 
the new Investment opportunities. Most 
of the ""'pondent~· 111\'e!<lnlents were 
concentrnted In locnl savlfllt9 accounts. 
chcocklng aceounts. Md fonn real estate. 
Few farmers hdd tn~tments outside of 
thf' state. or held mutunl funds. 
gO\'emlllent set'Urlll<6. and common 
stocks. ResJ>Ondcnts were prlrnartly 
concerned wtt h the yield and snfcly of 
Onanclal a~sel~. and ,tated that coping 
w11h emergencies ami r~tlremenl were 
tht>lr main reasons for lnvoslmenL 
Financial I'C<IJXIO'>C'ItO risk may Include 
tranSferrin!! risk outside the bustn~ 
such as Investing In nonf.-.rm Rnandal 
uS!>C!Is. By holding a portfolio of farm and 
nonfann assets. fonn hou~holds can 
diversify risk (Mishr!l and Morehart. 2001). 
Using n aUonnl fonn level data from the 
U.S. Department of Aylcullure. Mlshra 
and Morehnr1 lnvesUI(nted Lhe factors 
oJTectlng off-fann lnve&tntent of farm 
households. They found operator's ~· 
educational lt'vt'l. nrr-rarm Income. fonn 
siU. and houscllnld net worth wtTe 
positively related to orr-farm ln\~tment 
declslons. Furth<"l'. lncrcn!IOO on-fann 
dl•-erstRcnllon nnd hll(her clebt-t.o·assc:t 
ratiO rWUCCd the llkdlhood of off-fann 
Investment. 
Monke. S...,hiJ~. end Pederson (1990) 
employed blstorlrnl data for 1966-1988 
together w11h stochastic dominance 
analysts to tnvatlflal~ pr~-rellrement 
ln\~tment strnlegldl for farmers. and otr-
f<lmllnvestmcllls In particular. Based on 
their results. nhno"t n il risk-averse 
fanners wou id lftVor a dl"""'lfi~ portfolio 
over any slnl(lc re(u or finnnriAI asset. bul 
domlnant]>Clrtfollos typlrnlly lm'Oh't'dj u sl 
h~o•o or· three o..ssc:ls 
&hnltkey and l.ff (19951 reported that 
fannland accounted for a substantlnl 
proportion of the nSSC:b hdd by Ohio 
fanncn~ln the~ 1990s. 1hey used 
hislortcal data ln a rm:nn·v:u1:tnce portfolio 
framework to demon~I.J'Iltc that dlverstf)1ng 
ln•-estments Into ofT f"rm financtal assets 
MCshro and Lcncc 141 
(e.g .. stocks and bonds) may ttllow fanners 
to achieve a better comblnntlon of expected 
~tum and varian« of ~turns than 
portfoHos comprised mostly of farmlnnd. 
Betubtza and Leatham (1990) al!io focused 
on ll!(licuiLUral Onns' potenllal ~s from 
dtv~rstfylng Into orr-fann flnnnclal assets. 
Unlikt Schnitkey and Lee. they looked nt 
11te dynamics of accumulaUn.'( Rnandal 
nssels and at the Implications of off· fann 
dlvcrsiRcauon on th e firm's liquidity. 
leverage. and tenure. Acrordtng to the 
,...suits from thetr model, dlvttSIIlcatlon 
Into mutual funds would make Carrners 
001...,. otr. 
The results obtained by &hnttkey Md Lee 
(1995). and Betubl7.a and l.r.lthnm 11990) 
were consistent w1th I he Rndlngs reported 
by 1-lnR. Kowalski. and Hoffman (199 tl. 
I:I!Ult'tl on the grow1ng lnlerest of 
Institutional lnvC'8IIlnl In farm renl estate 
ns a means to dlvenJ.l(y their portfolios. 
Llns. Kowalski. and HotTman assessed the 
dl'"'"'lllcntlon potenllal of farmland for 
portfoliM dominated by U.S stocks and 
bonds. USing historical dnta for 
t97Q-1990 together w1th a meaJN'i\tlance 
approach. famlland was found to orr .... 
good dlverslflcntlon potenllul for Investors 
who held U.S. stock and boncls. Further. 
their results showed thnt diversifying Into 
furmlnnd allowed tnve1110n1 to nchleve 
~nlns similar to Lhosc obtained by 
ln,-.,sllng in forel!(n stocks. 
Mtshrn and Morehart 12000) noted farmers 
may use off·fann tm~tmenta to manage 
r1sk5. as such tnvestmffliS may help In 
stnblllzlng income and providing for 
rellrement and unexpl"dt;d personD.I Je.!( .. 
h~nlth) expenditures. They report<:<! t.hat 
the rallo of off-farm lnve$lllltllt8 IO total 
assets for U.S. fann houAeltnld~ Increased 
from 18% In 1992lo 31% In 1999. shO\vlng 
off-farm Investments or~ an Important 
component oC the inve&umnt portfoUo oC 
U.S. farm household!!. SpecJOrnlly. the 
tnrgest sban: oC U.S. foJ'lllenl off-fam> 
Investments corresponds to retirement 
accounts. followed by stocks Stnd mutual 
funds. Mlshra and Morehrui found that 
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off. fann Investments tended to be higher 
for younger and more educated fanners. 
for fan11 households \\1th !,'Teater off. farm 
Income and total household Income, for 
small and dtversU1ed forms. and for farms 
with lower debt-to·aSl'l<'l rnllos. 
Rlslr.-Management Toola and 
Financial Performance 
The 1996 federal Agriculture Improvement 
and Refom1 (fAIR) Act shilled the dal ry 
Industry toward a more market-oriented 
p11e1ng s tn•cture. \\1th more Input and 
output rtsk transferred back to dairy 
1>roducers. Brinch. Stoke~. and Wenver 
( 1999) lnvesUgated the 11Se of Multiple 
PerU Crop lnSUI"dnce IMPCI). Income 
Protecllon liP). Rnd Croup Risk Plan (GRP) 
Insurance risk management strategies on 
the financial perfonnance of daJry farms In 
Pennsylvania. Results of U1e study 
lndtented rtsk manal(eruent tends to 
marginally lower some measures of 
financial performance for dairy fonns. 
TI1Js was espectaJly true for producllon 
hed~,<lng. largely due to the more frequent 
rcsetUng of hedges. 
Ag:rl.cultural Lenders and Rlslr. 
Management 
According to Collins and Barry ( 1986). 
lo .. s .sharing among f'ann Credit System 
districts creates a free· rlder problem.• 
They provided a rr .. mework to argu~ that a 
central ~'TIIlty could evnluate the risklness 
of each district nnd adjust U1e cost of 
funds to each district so as to reflect Its 
corresponding external costs. In thJs 
manner, costs of funds would be 
lntema.lizcd And the free· rider problem 
would be ellmlnat<.'d. Collins and Barry 
:.lso ~xplalned ways to determine rl$k 
premiums. They suggest<'<! that the 
caJ~ulaUon of the cost of fwtds which 
lnternoll•.e the el\1emal costs of l'lsk 
manal(ement for each district and create 
,. t-leniiJl.)· <ll&l.J'IM~ a~ rttlufred to cnnll'rbutc. ~ .. • 
(() d bU'tS."'Cd dts:b1cts; I hull the possibility eJd!U5 (o.-
01\<: 11iSlr'IC"llO IIUI)O!SC: vtt<'m aJ to&l~ on ¢othcrt~ 
an netuartaUy neutral "tnsurance" ftmd 
hinged on the probability denstty funcllon 
(pdf) of the rate of return on assets . 
Collins and Barry pointed out that 
lmplementallon of their Instrument 
required the esllmatlon of the pdfs. nnd 
challenged future researchers to 
undertake lllls task. 
In the mld· l980s. deregulation of interest 
rates. Inflation and dellntlon. and 
a,:,<t1cullural recessions combined to 
destabilize the earnings of commerct<\1 
banks. In response to thls volatile 
rmanctnl enV1ronment. bankers employed 
various porlfoUo adjustments and assets 
and liability management strategic• to 
reduce risk exposure ond stnbil17.c proAts. 
The net Interest. margin (gross Interest 
tncome less~ tntere..t expense! 
conveys lnformaUon on the bank 
mrutagemcnl's effectJveness ln allocating 
funds and controllln,t( expenses. 
Pederson. Pokharel and Coon ( 1986) 
examined tlle varlablllty of bank Interest 
Income nnd how 11 related to bank 
management and portfolio char3cteristlcs. 
Banks with higher expected net lnt~rest 
margtru; were also found to exhibit greater 
gystematJc net Interest Income vnriabillty. 
Rao. Pederson. nnd Boehljc (1991) 
conslructed an econometric model of 
bank Investment Qnd funding. and use<l 
It to simulate optlmal asset· llablllty 
management declslons by means of u 
stoChastic control progrnm. Wh~n 
comparing the hlstor1c:ll asset and liability 
decisions made by the Farm Credit Banks 
with the optimal decisions calculated from 
thetr model. the nuthOJ'S found that the 
lbnner led 1 o faster gro\\.1.h of Qb!ietS and 
liabilities than the L~tter. 
Belonlila and Gilbert (1989) used data 
from agricultural banks for 1984- 1988 to 
a&Sess whether banks that falled 0\'<!1' this 
period did so because of their risk· 
managenlCJil s1 rategles. They concluded 
fl'lllcd banks were exposed to more risks 
than surviving banks. supporting the 
hypothesis that vulnerability to failure 
rellected management portfoUo decisions. 
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Issues for Future Research 
N; dcmonslr.:ued by the preceding review. 
the Regiona l Research Committee for 
Financing Aj(rlcullurc tn a Changing 
Environment; Macro. Market. Polley, and 
Management Issues land Its predecessors) 
has devoted stgntOcant efforts toward 
analyttng rlsk·manag.,ment str.>tegles In 
agriculture. and valu:lble Insights have 
been obtlllned os o result. However, this 
area of Inquiry Is quite rtch and there are 
Important Issues yel to be Investigated. 
Our knowledge of risk managcornentln 
agrtcultul'l' has the potential to be greatly 
enhanced by future research In the 
foUo"1ng areas of Inquiry. among others: 
• Contract Prodru~tion,. Production under 
contract has crm·rged ,,. the dominant 
producUon armngcmcnt tn rhe hog 
sector. TI1ere Is lltllc knowledl(e 
rcgardJng the Implications of contract 
produc tion eon risk management by both 
conu·acrm·s and producers. Future 
re's<:'arch s hould .. xplorc the lmpllcauons 
of cont r·actlng for lenders us well. 
• l?cccnt Risi..,Mwwgcmcnt Tools. For 
e.x.'lmple. fnm1ers now have available a 
large menu of novel Insurance produces 
d~lgned by 1 ht Risk Ma nagement 
1\r(Cill'Y (RMA) (e.g .. GRP, revenue 
tnstti1U1CC. ln<:orrre protecUon. whole 
fam1 lnsumnce). Efforts are needed to 
assess the tmp.1c1 or these risk· 
management cools on the financial 
perfonnnnce of fnnns. and on the risk· 
manllt(cment SU'Ulegles of lenders. 
• lrwcstrrreru Rtslcs As!<CCinred wltlt 
Conlrocr ProductfDrl. lrWCSI111ent In new 
farm lnfm•tructure (e.g .. new bulldlngs 
and equll>lllCJl\) has been spumed by 
production contracts. Furure studies 
s hould analy-t.e the extent of the risk:; 
associated wi!J r sul'll lnvesrments on 
t11e face or changeA tn conrracr 
s p<!clfi<·n t tons. 
• Fonvar<l Corumctt"O of Inputs. Forward 
corttruct.h II( of factors of production Is a 
grO\vlnl( t~ettvtty between the s uppliers of 
Mlslva and Lcncc 143 
Inputs and the ful'lner:; who usc r hem. 
Forward oontrocUng luputs could aid 
planning ;md allow farmers to dlvcrst(v 
purchases over time. Fol'\vnrd 
contracting of Inputs also guarantees 
participating farmen; an nssurcd supply 
of Inputs nt a spec!Oed price. Studies 
should be conducted to evaluate the 
effects or thls practice on the financial 
performance or farm bustneS5es. 
• Reductions In Goucmmcru Support. 
Future farm bills are llk.,ly ro Include 
provisions to reduce government 
support of the fann sector. thereby 
slgnlllcanUy altering the risk· 
management environment raoed by 
farmers. Studies asses&lng the Impact 
of payment UmltaUons on farm 
performance, asset values Onnd vnlues 
In particular). and economiC wdl·bclng 
or farms and t:.mr households s hould 
prove to be valuable contribu tions. 
• Rtsk-Manngemertl Tools .for Lt~>CS!O<'k 
Fanns. In recent ycurs. the RMA has 
developed rts k· mnnagemen l tools 
speclflcally designed ro manage risks of 
Uvestock farms. For example. In 2003. 
the RMA Introduced l.lvcsrock Prtce 
Insurance (!..PI). Studies evaluottng 
the use of LPI Md Its Impact on the 
financial perfom1ance of U~tock farms 
are warranted. 
• New Hazards. Mad cow disease. 
bloterrorlsm. Md avian Ou are 
prorlllnent examples of risks faced by 
agricultural producer!~ which were 
unheard of just a few years ago. A 
thorough examlnauon of the roots 
avallable to manage such rtsk!' nnd 
their Impact on U1e Onanclul 
performance of agrlbuslnesses and 
lenders seems necessary. 
• E'nhanoed Producrtor1 FlexibUUy. 111c 
1996 FAIR Acl gave fam1ers grerrter 
flexibility to choose among crops to be 
produced . Studies arc nccdcclt.o 
lnvcsllgate how this legts lm ton has 
affected rlsk· mauagemcnr Clcct~tons nt 
the tanulevcl. 
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• New T•'Chl•ologles. New technologies 
may have an Important lmpacl on rtsk 
management. For example. cross-
polllna llon of non -genetically mociUled 
(non-OM) c rops with CM crop$ moy 
grcotly t•cduce the va lue of the former. 
Sludles should be conducted to 
lnvesllgnle whether recenlly Introduced 
lcc.hnologles have affected ox!sting rtsk-
manlll(ement practic~ and whether 
new rtsk-managemenl tools need to be 
developed to cope wtth the new rtsk.s 
Involved. 
• Off·F'aml lrlcome and l rwestmcnt. OIT-
fAnn Income and lnvestmenl hove 
exhibited a positive trt"nd over time. 
Howt-ver. U1e aDlOUJlt of research 
devoted to them has not been 
romm~nsurate wtth their relative 
Importance. Studies focusing on the 
development of a gr<.>ater understanding 
of oiT fnrm lncome and investment 
pattems and opportunities should 
prove; valuable. 
• Produ('IIOil P>ucttces and RL•k-
Mwtagernent Tools. Some producUon 
pracllc~s )e.g .. Integrated pest 
11\l\nagemenl) may provide effecUve 
ways 10 manage rtsk.s. whereas other 
practices may require a careful choice of 
risk-management tools to be attractive. 
CompeliUon versus complementnritles 
In the use or producuon pr.lcllcca a nd 
llnnnclal lnstrwnents lo mnnal(c risks 
clc;arly IS an area worthy of research 
e!Torts In the future. 
In sumnmry. rtsk Is a aitical chornctertsuc 
of production agriculture. and fann.s. 
''l(rtbuslncl\scs. and lenders are a ll 
subsl1lnllully exposed to various types of 
risks . Conse<tuenUy. tt. Is not surprising 
th~t subsiantlal resou rccs have been 
devoted 10 research regardln.l( rls l<-
mana,gemt-nt1ssu~s. The present study 
survey• the slgnlllcant body of research 
on the !Oplc generated by the Reglonnl 
Rese:trch Committee for F'1nanelng 
1\gJ'tcullure In a Changing E:nv!roruncnt: 
Macro. Market. PoUcy. and Management 
Issue!!. and Its predecessors. 
For this purpose. risk-managemenl 
stralcglcs ore classified Into two main 
categortcs- "wlthln-firm" strategies ru1d 
"rlsk· shartng· strategies. Ctven the 
Utcra ture exrunJned here and the recent 
developments tlmt have occut·red In the 
U.S. agncultural sector. U1e present. 
s1udy ldenllOes a number of research 
topics worthy of attention for fu!Ure 
research In Lhe Reid. The hope Is that 
suc.h researclJ endea•-ors will be M 
productive ns the previous e!Torls reported 
here have proven to be. 
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